Topics in Cognitive Science Postgrad Seminar 2006 (Phil708)
Lecturer: John Collier ( collierj@ukzn.ac.za ) 

Last revised: October 16, 2006


Topic: Interactivism

We meet 14:00-16:00 Tuesdays in the Philosophy Resource Room (MTB 315 on the old numbering system)


August 8 –15 Readings:

From In Critical Condition, Jerry Fodor 1998, MIT Press, the following essays:

    There are no recognitional concepts – Not even RED

    There are no recognitional concepts – Not even RED, Part 2: The plot thickens
Here is a rendition of Fodor's argument in chapters 4 and 5. Notice that it is an indirect argument. You might find it useful to transform the argument into Reasonable format.

    Do we think in mentalese? Remarks on some arguments of Peter Carruthers (available on Cog Sci disk 2006 under reviews)

- These readings give Fodor's main arguments against empiricism, and clarify his version of rationalism.
- You might find the article by Christopher Green under Innatism on the Cog Sci 2006 CD on Chomsky's innatism on syntax useful too compare with Fodor's arguments for innatism in semantics. There are clear parallels, but note the restrictions on Chomsky's views to syntax, and other restrictions and modifications to take into consideration empirical evidence.
- A classic but unmentioned source for there being recognitional concepts, and what the consequences are, in light of modern logic and psychology, is chapter 2 of W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (1960, MIT Press). Quine takes a basically behaviorist and physicalist approach to linguistic concepts, and presumably mental concepts as well. An important consequence of Quine's arguments is that translation (and hence reference) is indeterminate, and that meaning is not fully determinate. Fodor seems to believe that this cannot be the case, that all languages are translatable into mentalese and vice versa -- how significant is this assumption for Fodor's argument? Is it required? Is it supportive?



August 22 - 29 Readings:

From In Critical Condition, Jerry Fodor 1998, MIT Press, the following essays:

    Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky’s solution doesn’t work.

    Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky’s solution still doesn’t work.

Smolensky home page is http://www.cog.jhu.edu/faculty/smolensky/. You can find some recent presentations on optimality, integration, and his views on symbols and connectionism as compatible from this page.
There are other papers available through David Chalmers excellent bibliography page at http://consc.net/biblio/4.html#4.3. Here is Chalmers critique of Fodor and Pylyshyn.

You may find this longish paper by Fodor and  Pylyshyn  on connectionism  useful. It started the debate.


September 5 - 12 Readings (On Cog Sci CD) I will be away in Poland. David will do these.
    Harnad, S  Computation Is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation: Cognition Isn't.
    Wheeler, M. Two Threats to Representation.
Please come prepared with a 500m word summary of Harnad's argument. The discussion of Turing machines in the August 29 class should help you with this.


September 19 Readings Mark Bickhard, Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Representation
    Concentrate on section 4, which deals with current models of representation, and Bickhard's criticism of encodingism.


September 26 Break


October 3. Readings: Continue with Bickhard, Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Representation; start Bickhard, Interactivism Manifesto.


There are three more weeks to the the time I have to go to Canada for the Philosophy of Science meetings: October 10, 17 and 24. I suggest doing the following topics: encodingism, function, volition. Papers are available from Bickhard, Christensen and Collier on these topics. Each person taking the course for credit should choose a topic among the three (no overlap) and I will suggest readings for presentation and background (you can add to these if you like). Then you should assign readings for the class for your topic and lead the class discussion. Consult with me before you do.


October 10. Hugh on encodingism and representation, read Bickhard The Dynamical Emergence of Representation


October 17. Mahendran on volition, read Wayne Christensen, The Evolutionary Origins of Volition


October 24. Stuart on function and autonomy, Mark Bickhard, Autonomy, Function, and Representation

                      Secondary, John Collier, Interactively Open Autonomy Unifies Two Approaches to Function

First paper due after the break (October 3, 2006). Topic to be assigned. Weight 33%.

    The topic is: Can representation be distributed? If so, does this affect Fodor's argument against recognitional concepts?

          You will need to think about this one before you write, and probably discuss it with me and others in order to get to the essential issues. Note that distributed representation could mean in the PDP (network) sense, or the distributed cognition sense, or both. Choose one, rather thna trying to cover all of the bases, which is impossible. Your job is to explore the issues, but I expect you to keep your arguments as lucid and as tight as you can.


Second paper due end of semester. Topic open, but you are required to do a class presentation after discussion with me, and this is a likely topic for your final paper. Weight 67%